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Officer. In light of the Brent9 decision, this must be so as regards the
Special Inquiry Officer, but it leaves unanswered the question of the
status of an applicant for landing in Canada generally, under the
Act. In other words, the position of the Special Inquiry Officer aside,
the question is whether any one is entitled to enter Canada as of
right if he complies with the provisions of the Act. It is submitted that
the answer must be in the negative. A reading of the Act as a whole
leads one to the conclusion that the Minister is given an overriding
discretion to determine who is and who is not a suitable immigrant.10
In the instant case, the appellant's position was reviewed on two
separate occasions by the Minister, and both times his application
was refused. Very little was said about this aspect of the case in
either of the judgments, and there was no indication that the Minister
had acted in bad faith in refusing the application. Consequently, even
if Cartwright J. was correct in holding that the deportation order
was ultra vires the Special Inquiry Officer, his judgment does not
get around the difficulty that the deportation order was confirmed by
the Minister in a valid exercise of his discretion, and consequently
was in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Such being the
case, the privative clause was applicable and the court had no jurisdiction to quash the order.

CREDITORS RIGHTS
Canadian Admiral Corporation Limited v. L. F. Dommerich and
Company Incorporated, [1964] S.C.R. 238.
C. H. FOSTER "
CREDITORS'

RIGHTS BANKRUPTCY RESPECTIVE RIGHTS OF AsSIGNEE OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND CREDITOR CLAIMING SET-OFF.

The problem facing the Supreme Court of Canada was whether
an assignee of accounts receivable, under a "factoring arrangement"
with its assignor, would be subject to a set-off arising from a subsequent purchase by the assignor from the firm that was indebted to
the assignor and whose account had been previously assigned to the
assignee.
The Supreme Court of Canada reversed both the trial decision
and that of the Ontario Court of Appeal1 and unanimously held that
a set-off could be exercised.
9 Ibid.

10 Cf. Massella v. Langlais, [1955) S.C.R. 263 at 281, where Judson J.
expressed this view as to the purpose of the Act.
*Mr. Foster is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [1962] O.R. 902.
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The facts were that Canadian Admiral Corporation Limited were
purchasers of materials from Rotor Electric Company Limited. Up
to September, 1954, Admiral had made payments direct to Rotor for
such purchases. However, from that time on, Rotor entered into a
"factoring arrangement" with L. F. Dommerich and Company Incorporated, the plaintiff in the trial court and respondent in the two
appeal courts, whereby Rotor would assign its accounts receivable
to Dommerich and the latter would notify Admiral that these debts
had been assigned and then collect them for a stated charge to Rotor.
From September, 1954, to February, 1960, the procedure was that
Rotor would prepare the invoices pertaining to its sales to Admiral
and send them to both Dommerich and Admiral. On the invoice sent
to Dommerich there was an enclosed document stating that such
account had been assigned to Dommerich for valuable consideration.
Dommerich in turn would then invoice Admiral for this same amount.
On the invoice sent by Rotor to Admiral were stamped two notices:
one stated that any objections to the bill were to be reported to Dommerich and the other, that the account had been transferred and assigned to Dommerich for valuable consideration. Within this period,
any payment Admiral had made had been to Dommerich.
In October, 1959, Admiral, which had been purchasing materials
from Rotor, reversed its role to that of a vendor and sold a quantity
of stereo tuners to Rotor. At the time of the first delivery of these
tuners, the amount owing by Admiral to Dommerich pursuant to
the purchases Admiral had made from Rotor was an amount greater
than the sale price of the tuners. The President of Admiral, who
knew that the President of Rotor had earlier been involved in a business failure, wished to protect Admiral's financial position and hence in
order to insure that Admiral would always be more indebted to Rotor
than Rotor to Admiral, instructed the accounts payable supervisor
to hold a substantial sum in reserve in order to offset what was on the
accounts receivable ledger for Rotor. When Rotor went into bankruptcy, it owed Admiral an amount slightly less than the price of
the tuners. It was only when Dommerich claimed from Admiral the
total amount of the prior assignments, that Dommerich learned of
the sale from Admiral to Rotor. Neither Rotor nor Dommerich up to
that time had any notice or knowledge of the intention of Admiral
to hold back an amount equal to the sale price of the tuners.
Thus the action arose when Dommerich claimed that amount
from Admiral which Admiral had sought to set-off in complete
extinction of Rotor's debt.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeal of Ontario held
that no set-off would be allowed. In the Supreme Court of Canada,
these decisions were unanimously reversed and Admiral was permitted to exercise a set-off. Thus, in order to understand the Supreme
Court's decision and in particular to indicate why it decided to allow
the set-off, it will be necessary to examine the decision of both the
Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court.
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The Court of Appeal speaking through Laidlaw, J.A. disallowed

a set-off on the grounds that the arrangement between Rotor and
Dommerich constituted an equitable assignment of future choses in
action and consequently there could be no set-off by Admiral after
it had received notice of the assignment. The basis for this holding
was determined by several factors. First, the court recognized the
notation that appeared on each of the accounts payable ledger sheets
pertaining to the Rotor account. This notation read that all cheques
were to be made payable to Dommerich commencing from September
13, 1954. Secondly, the actual business procedure that had been
practised between Admiral, Rotor and Dommerich was reviewed by
the court and found to support its conclusion that the agreement
constituted an equitable assignment of future choses in action. This
procedure consisted of Rotor preparing the invoices for sales to
Admiral, addressing them to Admiral and stamping on each invoice
two notices: one, that objections to the bill were to be reported to
Dommerich and the other, that the account had been transferred and
assigned to Dommerich for valuable consideration. These invoices
were then sent to Dommerich which in turn forwarded them to
Admiral. Laidlaw, JA. concluded that:
. no set-off or counterclaim could be allowed in respect of a debt
arising between Admiral and Rotor subsequent
to the notice to Admiral
of the assignment from Rotor to Dommerich.2

For authority he relied on a statement by Vaines:
...
after notice of an assignment of a chose in action the debtor cannot
by payment or otherwise do anything to take away or diminish the
rights of the assignee as they stood at the time of the notice. And so
no set-off or counter-claim will be allowed in respect of a debt arising
between the original parties subsequently to the notice of the assignments,
unless such debt flows out of, and is inseparably connected with the
dealings and
3 transactions which also give rise to the subject of the
assignment.

Obiter, the Court of Appeal concluded that even if there was no
equitable assignment and the rights of Dommerich depended upon
separate assignments from Rotor to Dommerich, nevertheless each
invoice contained express notice to Admiral of the assignments.
Furthermore, at the time Admiral sold the tuners to Rotor, Admiral
owed Dommerich per the assignments $62,470.67 which was greater
than the sale price of the tuners ($43,942.52). In this regard, Laidlaw, JA. held:
Thus, it was not permissible in law for Admiral to set-off against that
debt or any part thereof owing by Admiral to Dommerich and of which
Admiral had notices of assignment, 4a debt which arose subsequent to
the time when it received such notices.
Thus, the basis of the Court of Appeal's decision was that
once the assignments had commenced, Admiral which had actual
notice of such assignments, could not defeat the interests of Dom2 [1962] O.R. 902, 909.
3 Vaines, J. C., Personal Property, (2nd) p. 211; [19623 O.R. 910.
4 [1962] O.R. 902, 910.
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merich by asserting a set-off. In other words Dommerich, it is submitted, was in the position of a secured creditor by way of assignment
vis-A-vis Admiral, regardless of what has subsequently ensued between
Admiral and Rotor after Admiral received actual notice of the
assignments.
Whether the arrangement was classified as an equitable assignment of future choses in action or merely as a combination of
successive assignments, the effect of the receipt of notice by Admiral
seemed to be the key factor according to the Court of Appeal in the
securing of Dommerich's interest against a potential set-off. Laidlaw,
JA. states:
I find expressly that after the receipt by Admiral of the letter from
Rotor dated September 13, 1954, Admiral had notice of the assignment
by Rotor to Dommerich of future debts owing by Admiral to Rotor and
that Admiral could not thereafter do anything to take away or diminish
the rights
of Dommerich as they stood at the time of receipt of that
notice.5

At the time of "that notice" on September 13, 1954, the debt
owed by Admiral to Rotor was $1,045.30 and hence, it is submitted
on this reasoning, that if the sale of the tuners from Admiral to
Rotor occurred thereafter and prior to any further assignments,
then the right of Admiral for the sale price of the tuners would be
subjected to the prior amount of $1,045.30. If, on the other hand, the
facts had been that the sale of the tuners had occurred prior to any
assignments other than the original assignment of $1,045.30 but
that there were subsequent assignments after the tuner sale, it would
seem to follow that the subsequent assignments would be subject to
the rights of Admiral which in turn would be subject to the first
assignment of $1,045.30. In other words, it would be a situation
analogous to that of a priority situation with each priority depending
upon the receipt of notice. This line of reasoning, it is submitted, is
supported by the above statement of Laidlaw, J.A. that the rights
between the parties were determined "as they stood at the time
of receipt of that notice".6
How then did the Supreme Court of Canada circumvent the
above holding of the Court of Appeal that a set-off could not be
exercised? The crux of the Supreme Court's decision was stated by
Judson J. who held that:
• . . the result was that on receipt of the invoice stamped with the
assignment, Admiral was not entitled after this date to set-off against
that invoice an indebtedness of Rotor which arose subsequent to the
date of the notice of the assignment of that account but the converse
also holds true. Admiral was entitled to assert with respect to any
particular assignment that on the date when notice of that assignment
was given, and proper accounting
between Admiral and Rotor, there
was nothing owing to Rotor. 7
5

Id., at 909.

6 Ibid.
7

[1964J S.C.R. 238, 246.
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The phrase in the above statement which distinguishes it from
the Court of Appeal's decision is the phrase-"but the converse also
holds true". Subject to this onerous proviso, it would appear that when
Admiral received each notice of assignment as stamped upon each
respective invoice, Admiral could not exercise a set-off against that
particular invoice. How then was the proviso interpreted? The subsequent line of the reasoning explains how the converse would seem to
hold true. It would appear that subsequent to any particular assignment Admiral was "entitled", although not legally bound, to state its
position by having a "proper accounting" undertaken between Admiral
and Rotor. If this was the situation, what interpretation can be placed
on the phrase---"there was nothing owing to Rotor"? To revert back
to the fact situation, Rotor owed Admiral, at the time of the bankruptcy, $43,942.52 for the tuners and Admiral owed Dommerich
$49,871.57 for the assignments. Admiral at this time paid the difference to Dommerich in order not to prejudice Admiral's position. Was
this balancing of accounts by Admiral an example of a "proper
accounting"? Was this an accounting between Admiral and Rotor or
between Admiral and Dommerich? In light of the Supreme Court's
decision, this would appear to be a "proper accounting" and could
have been exercised by Admiral at any time despite its receipt of the
notices of assignment.
It would appear that Admiral could remain silent, although aware
of its potential set-off, and at any time have the accounts examined
so as to determine what each party owed the other. In other words,
the receipt of notice and the effect of such notice would be of no
consequence to Admiral, for it could at any time demand a balance
of accounts. Consequently, rather than Dommerich being in the position of a secured assignee, Admiral, the original debtor, now finds itself
in the fortunate position of being a secured creditor. Admiral became
a secured creditor regardless of its receipt of notices of assignments
and regardless of the fact that when Rotor bought the tuners Admiral
owed Dommerich via the assignment arrangement an amount greater
than the sale price of the tuners.
Counsel for Dommerich contended that the onus was on Admiral
to warn or advise of a possible set-off that might arise. To support
their submission, three Canadian cases8 were relied upon. Although no
reference was made to these cases in the Supreme Court, it is submitted that a distinction should have been made on the ground that
these particular cases were within the realm of Banking Law and
the peculiarities of the banker-customer relationship. The duties of
the customer (although the Ewing case was a banking situation yet
not a literal banker-customer relationship) to a bank are not analogous to those duties and legal obligations within either an assignment
or "factoring" assignment.
8 Ewing v. Dominion Bank (1901), 35 S.C.R. 133, 153; Lazard Bros. and
Oo. v. Union Bank, 47 O.L.R. 76, 82; W. H. Fraserv. Imperial Bank, 47 S.C.R.

313, 379.
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To buttress their holding that the onus was not upon Admiral to
warn of a set-off, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the case of
Mangles v. Dixon9 which held that:
the principle is perfectly clear, that where there is no fraud, nothing
to lead to the conclusion in the mind of the party who receives the
notice, that the party who gives it has been deceived and is likely to
sustain a loss ... it is clear that the former is not bound to volunteer
information.10
This statement of general principle supported the view as held by

Judson J. that:
it was for Dommerich to look after its own business and for Admiral
to mind its own business. Admiral did not mislead Dommerich and was
under no obligation to disclose its own dealings and to volunteer information. The onus was on Dommerich, as assignee, to satisfy itself as to
the equities
which might exist when it took these assignments month
by month.11

The Mangles case, relied upon as authority for the non-volunteering of information, seems by this decision to completely counteract

the receipt and effect of notice as a means to cut-off future set-offs.
Obiter, the Supreme Court adopted the submission of counsel
for Admiral that even if the agreement was an equitable assignment

of future choses in action, it was void as against the creditors of

Rotor for non-compliance with the Assignment of Book Debts Act.12
Section 3 of that Act reads:
3(1). Except as provided in this Act, every assignment of book debts
made by a person engaged in a trade or business in Ontario Is
absolutely void as against the creditors of the assignor and as
against the subsequent purchasers unless the assignment Is ...
(c) registered, as hereinafter provided, together with the affidavits
within thirty days of the execution of the assignment.
Admiral was a creditor entitled to the protection of this Act.
The document was not registered nor did it comply with any of the
statutory requirements. In the Court of Appeal, Laidlaw, JA. spoke
of the Act as not being applicable and that:
...it was not raised at the trial or in the notice of appeal or in the
memorandum of points of fact and law filed on behalf of the appellant. It
appears to me to have been a last moment endeavour to support the
appeal but there is no merit in it.13
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court did not adopt this
approach but referred to the Act by way of dicta.
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada is the preferred
decision particularly in view of the seemingly unsettled nature of, and

ambiguities related to, the law of assignments.
9 (1852) 3 H.L.C. 702.

10 Id., at 734 and found at (1964] S.C.R. 241.
11 [1964] S.C.R. 238, 247.
12
13

R.S.O. 1960, c. 24.
[1962] O.R. 902, 911.
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An influential legal decision is one that possesses persuasive
qualities and attributes as illustrated by its consideration of all
relevant courses of action applicable to the fact situation facing the
court of law. This decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, it is
submitted, lacks this necessary persuasive element particularly in
view of its rather abrupt dismissal and consequent reversal of the
holding of the Ontario Court of Appeal. That the Supreme Court was
hesitant or failed to conduct a thorough analysis of the problem
tends only to reinforce this submission.
Certain policy considerations appear to have influenced the
decision of the Supreme Court. Towards the end of his judgment,
Judson J. contends that:
the arrangement was entirely for the financial advantage and convenience of Rotor and Dommerich. Dommerich earned a fee and Rotor
avoided the trouble of running a collection department. I can see no
reason why such an arrangement should impose additional duties on
Admiral as a purchaser of Rotor's products or restrict the rights which
it would otherwise
have in dealing back and forth with this supplier
and customer.1 4
That the arrangement was for the benefit of Dommerich and
Rotor only cannot be denied. Certainly Admiral had nothing to gain
from such an arrangement. Hence, why should Admiral be thrust into
a detrimental position because of this private and mutually beneficial
dealing between Rotor and Dommerich? It can be validly argued
that Admiral could have sold the tuners to Rotor by means of a
secured sales transaction. But why should an independant contractual
arrangement between Rotor and Dommerich be permitted to affect
the rights of Admiral? Thus it would appear that these policy considerations were influential in the Supreme Court's decision yet were
not examined in the Court of Appeal.
...

This case, it is submitted, is indicative of the court's reluctance
to aid a professional business concern that has failed to avail itself
of all the information that could quite easily be obtained by it. Since
the President of Rotor had been involved in a previous business failure,
one would conjecture that the dealings between Rotor and Dommerich
would have been more closely scrutinized. For example, the suspicions
of Dommerich should have been aroused when the amount of the
assigned accounts receivable increased from $1,045.30 in 1954 to
$62,470.67 in 1959. That Dommerich's letter to Admiral remained
unanswered seems to suggest that Dommerich was not acting as would
a prudent business concern. Furthermore, if Dommerich were unaware of the credit rating of Rotor, then it was only Dommerich that
was to blame. Certainly any court of law would not have been in
sympathy with such a careless firm.
The question arises as to whether this decision would have been
materially altered if the current draft bill in Ontario that is-appropriately referred to as "An Act to reform and make uniform the Law
14

[1964] S.C.R. 238, 247.
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regarding Security Interests in Personal Property and Fixtures" had
been enacted. There are several sections in this draft bill that appear
to have some relevance to the issue in this case.
Section 14 states:
An agreement by a buyer not to assert against an assignee any claim

or defence that he may have against the seller is enforceable by the
assignee who takes the assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice, except as to such defences as may be asserted against a holder
in due course of a negotiable instrument under the Bills of Exchange
Act (Canada).

This section seems to be only a statutory expression of a contract
law principle providing that the "agreement" was a valid and enforceable agreement as supported by valuable consideration. To persuade
a buyer or account debtor to enter into such an enforceable agreement
would certainly solidify the position of the assignee but, it is submitted, that many buyers would undoubtedly be hostile to such an
agreement. That many buyers or account debtors would subject
themselves to such an agreement would depend, of course, on their
bargaining power, their legal naivetM, and the terms and conditions
of the total commercial transaction.
A more relevant section is section 37(1) (a) and (b). This states:
Section 37(1)
Unless an account debtor has made an enfordeable agreement not
to assert defences or claims arising out of a sale as provided by
section 14, the rights of an assignee are subject to,
(a) the contract between the account debtor and the assignor; and
(b) any other defence or claim of the account debtor against the
assignor that accrued before the account debtor received notice
of the assignment.

It should be noted that s. 37 refers to s. 14 as an "enforceable
agreement", whereas s. 14 in its actual wording contemplates merely
an "agreement". However, as submitted above, s. 14 must contemplate an "enforceable agreement", for otherwise the latter section
would have little legal effect. An oddity of s. 37(1) (a) is that it
refers to only one contract and thus the applicability of this particular section to the rights and liabilities of Rotor, Dommerich and
Admiral would be afflicted with some inherent problems. Does "the
contract" refer to the contractual situation regarding the original
sales transactions flowing from Rotor to Admiral or to the quite
distinct and separate contractual situation with reference to the sales
of the stereos by Admiral as vendor to Rotor, the purchaser? There
is nothing in the Act to indicate that this section should necessarily
refer to the first contract, viz., that contract having as its subject
matter the sales by Rotor to Admiral. Hence, it is submitted on this
reasoning that this section of the draft bill would not have altered
the decision of the Supreme Court.
Section 37(1) (b) like Section 37(1) (a) speaks in the singular
as it seems to contemplate only one assignment in that the section

1965]

Supreme Court Review

specifically refers to "the assignment". What then would be the legal
solution to a situation involving several assignments together with
an equal number of notices that had been received by the account
debtor? The section specifies that the rights of the assignee are
subject to those defences that accrued "before" the account debtor
received notice of the assignment. The situation contemplated by
Section 37(1) (b) would consequently stand in complete hostility to
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. However, section 37
does not qualify or limit itself by any reference that subsections (a)
and (b) are necessarily the only rights to which an assignee is
subjected.
A brief conclusion may be drawn at this point. If the rights
of an assignee are subject to additional claims of defenses other
than those enumerated in section 37 of the draft bill, an additional
claim or defense certainly must include the one as promulgated in this
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. Said defense or set-off
arose on the ground that the account debtor was "entitled", yet not
legally bound in the absence of fraud, either to inform or to volunteer
information to the assignee of the potential right of set-off that
could and did, in fact, result, from an independant sales transaction
by the account debtor to the assignor.

CRIMINAL LAW
Regina v. Cotd, [1964] S.C.R. 1.
R. WITrE=CK :'
CAPITAL MURDER ACCUSED AND COMPANION COMMITTING ROBBERY
VICTIM DYING FROM INJURIES INFLICTED TO FACILITATE OFFENCE
-INJURIES
MUST BE CAUSED OR AIDED BY ACCUSED'S OWN ACT TO BE

-

GUILTY OF CAPITAL MURDER -

DRUNKENESS AS A POSSIBLE DEFENCE

WHETHER JURY PROPERLY DIRECTED -

CRIMINAL CODE, ss.

202,

202A.
The accused, Marcel Cot6, was charged and found guilty1 of the
offence of capital murder under the combined effect of s. 202A(2)
4
(b) (i)2 and s. 202 (a) (i) and (ii)3 of the Canadian Criminal Code.
*Mr. Witterick is a second year student at Osgoode Hall Law School.

1 The trial decision was not reported.

2 202A(2). Murder is capital murder, in respect of any person, where
(b) it is within section 202 and such person
(i) by his own act caused or assisted in causing the bodily harm
from which death resulted.
3 202. Culpable homicide is murder where a person causes the death of
a human being while committing or attempting to commit treason or an
offence mentioned in section 52, piracy, escape or rescue from prison or lawful
[Footnote Continued Next Page.]

